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both state and federal courts have asserted that the ad damnum
clause exists solely to enable courts to assess whether they have
jurisdiction over particular matters.71 Consequently, the legitimacy
of the prejudice bar to ad damnum clause amendments clearly is
suspect.
Notably, the Loomis decision did not address the issue
whether, absent a motion by the plaintiff, a court may act sua
sponte to award more damages than requested in the ad damnum
clause. The federal courts consistently have conformed judgments
to verdicts in the absence of motions to amend. 2 Moreover, the
explicit language of CPLR 3017(a) would seem to compel similar
action by the New York courts.7 3 Nevertheless, because the Loomis
Court did not resolve this question, it is suggested that counsel for
the plaintiff would be well-advised to move to amend the ad
damnum clause to conform to the verdict, and not rely upon a
court to act sua sponte.
Steven M. Rapp
DEVELOPMENTS IN

NEW YORK LAW

Fellow servant rule held an inadmissible defense to an employee's
action against his employer for injuries sustained due to the negligence of a coemployee
71

One federal court has noted that the ad dannum clause is "totally irrelevant" to the

amount of money damages which a plaintiff may be awarded. Zuckerman v. Tatarian, 418
F.2d 878, 880 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1069 (1970). Indeed, the significance of
the ad damnum clause has been addressed persuasively:
The purpose of the ad damnum is only to establish jurisdiction. It has no bearing
on what should be awarded to the plaintiff by the verdict.... [I]t is immaterial
what the plaintiff thinks he should be awarded. It is immaterial what the defendant thinks should be awarded to the plaintiff.
Mitchell v. American Tobacco Co., 28 F.R.D. 315, 318 (M.D. Pa. 1961) (quoting AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION OF INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSA-

163, 179-81 (1959)). The singular jurisdictional significance of the ad damnum
clause also has been noted by several New York courts. "[T]he ad damnum clause has no
other relevance or probative weight ...
except to confirm that plaintiff has in fact chosen
the proper court, in a jurisdictional sense, to determine his action." Gold v. Huntington
Town House, 64 App. Div. 2d 885, 887, 407 N.Y.S.2d 907, 909 (2d Dep't 1978) (Suozzi, J.,
dissenting).
72 E.g., Steinmetz v. Bradbury Co., 618 F.2d 21, 24 (8th Cir. 1980); Southwestern Inv.
Co. v. Cactus Motor Co., 355 F.2d 674, 678 (10th Cir. 1966); United States ex rel. Bachman
& Keffer Constr. Co. v. H.G. Cozad Constr. Co., 324 F.2d 617, 620 (10th Cir. 1963); Riggs,
Ferris & Geer v. Lillibridge, 316 F.2d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1963).
73 See CPLR 3017(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); note 38 supra.
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Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer generally is liable for injuries caused by the negligent acts of his employees.7 4 Significantly, pursuant to the fellow servant rule, an employer need not redress such injuries when the person harmed also
is one of his employees.7 5 The import of this rule, which has been
criticized as unjust by courts and commentators,7 8 has been dimin74 Burger Chef Sys. v. Govro, 407 F.2d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 1969); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 219 (1958); see P.S. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 254 (3d
ed. 1980); J. MUNKMAN, EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY AT COMMON LAW 87 (7th ed. 1971). The vicarious liability of the employer for the torts of his employees is based upon the concept that
the employer controls and directs the methods used by the employee in the execution of his
duties. The employer, therefore, assumes the risk of loss resulting from injuries caused by
the employee's negligence. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 208, Comment a (1958);
Conant, Liability of Principalsfor Torts of Agents: A Comparative View, 47 NEB. L. REV.
42, 45 (1968).
71 E.g., Farwell v. Boston & W.R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49, 57 (1842); Murray
v. South
Carolina R.R., 26 S.C.L. (1 McMul.) 385, 396-97 (1841); Priestly v. Fowler, [1835-1842] All.
E.R. 449, 451. The fellow servant rule was created in Priestly, wherein Lord Abinger reasoned that the extension of the master's liability to his servants, once admitted, would carry
forward to an "alarming" extreme. Priestly v. Fowler, [1835-1842] All. E.R. 449, 451; see
H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT COVERING THE RELATION,
DUTIES AND LIABIUTIES OF EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYEES 795 (1877); NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY FIRST REPORT 12 (1910) [hereinafter cited as WAINWRIGHT
COMMISSION REPORT]. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 80, at
528-29 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 474 (1958). One of the justifications historically advanced for the fellow servant rule was that the employee voluntarily and
knowingly took on the ordinary risks of employment. See Farwell v. Boston & W.R.R., 45
Mass. (4 Met.) 49, 57 (1842). Indeed, the employee was presumed to enjoy complete mobility in a market of unlimited employment opportunities. Therefore, he was expected to assume all the usual risks of his employment and to know the deficiencies of his fellow employees. See id. Another justification for the rule was the belief that carelessness in the
workplace would be discouraged if no right of action existed in favor of coemployees and
against employers. See id. Although such principles were applicable to small establishments
and shops, they had little validity in large enterprises. 2 LABATT, MASTER AND SERVANT §§
472, 473 (1904); W. PROSSER, supra, § 80, at 526-29.
Relying on Massachusetts and South Carolina authorities, see Farwell v. Boston &
W.R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49, 57 (1842); Murray v. South Carolina R.R., 26 S.C.L. (1 McMul.) 385, 396-97 (1838), the New York courts adopted the fellow servant rule in 1851. Coon
v. Syracuse & Utica R.R., 5 N.Y. 492, 496 (1851); see Sherman v. Rochester & S.R.R., 17
N.Y. 153, 156 (1858); cf. Keegan v. Western R.R., 8 N.Y. 175, 180 (1853) (fellow servant rule
inapplicable when injury results directly from employer's negligence). The early New York
cases, as did most cases in jurisdictions which adopted the fellow servant rule, involved the
liability of railroad companies. E.g., Farwell v. Boston & W.R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49,60-62
(1842); Sherman v. Rochester & S.R.R., 17 N.Y. 153, 156 (1858). One commentator stated
that it was "more than a coincidence" that the fellow servant rule developed during the era
of great railroad expansion. Steuer, The Fellow Servant Rule in New York, 6 FoRDHAM L.
REv. 361, 361 (1937). For a discussion of the early cases involving railroad company liability,
see H.G. WOOD, supra, at 795 n.1.
76 E.g., Crenshaw Bros. Produce Co. v. Harper, 142 Fla. 27, 47, 194 So. 353, 361 (1940)
(dictum); Poniatowski v. City of New York, 14 N.Y.2d 76, 81, 198 N.E.2d 237, 238, 248
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ished by workers' compensation 7 and employers' liability laws. 78
Nevertheless, the rule may be invoked in the infrequent case when
79
injured employees do not fall within the scope of these statutes.
N.Y.S.2d 849, 851 (1964); C. EASTMAN, WORK ACCIDENTS AND THE LAW 172-82 (1910); WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 75, at 73 app. I. In Crenshaw, the plaintiff was
injured in a collision caused by a coemployee who was the driver of a truck in which the
plaintiff was a passenger. Crenshaw Bros. Produce Co. v. Harper, 194 So. at 356. Reasoning
that the fellow servant rule was a judicially created defense and thus not binding, the Crenshaw court stated that, in future cases, it would not adhere to the doctrine. Id. at 363-64.
Similarly, in Poniatowski v. City of New York, 14 N.Y.2d 76, 81, 198 N.E.2d 237, 238, 248
N.Y.S.2d 849, 851 (1964), a New York City police officer, who had been injured in a car
driven by a fellow officer, sought to recover for his injuries from the city. Id. Although the
Court of Appeals granted relief pursuant to a provision of the Municipal Law, it also commented upon the injustice of the fellow servant rule. Justice Fuld, in dictum, stated:
The inherent injustice of a rule which denies a person, free of fault, the right to
recover for injuries sustained through the negligence of another over whose conduct he has no control merely because of the fortuitous circumstance that the
other is a fellow officer is manifest.
Id. at 81, 198 N.E.2d at 238, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 851. Twelve years after Poniatowski was decided, the Supreme Court, Kings County, relying exclusively on the dictum in Poniatowski,
held that the fellow servant rule no longer was viable, and permitted a police officer who
negligently was shot by a fellow officer to recover damages from the city. Jakes v. City of
New York, 88 Misc. 2d 355, 358, 388 N.Y.S.2d 507, 509 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1976); see
Buckley v. City of New York, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 28, 1980, at 13, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County),
aff'd mem., 81 App. Div. 2d 1044 (1st Dep't 1981) (allowing officer to recover damages based
upon abrogation of fellow servant rule).
11 See W. PROSSER, supra note 75, § 80, at 533. In response to the large number of
industrial accidents leaving employees and their families destitute, the New York legislature, in 1909, enacted a workers' compensation law. See N.Y. LAB. LAW art. 14-a (1910). The
law, however, was declared unconstitutional in Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 317,
94 N.E. 431, 448 (1911). Thereafter, the New York State Constitution was amended to provide that it should not be construed as limiting the legislature's power to enact a workers'
compensation statute. See N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 18. Finally, in 1913, on the authority of the
amendment, the legislature enacted the New York Workers' Compensation Law, ch. 816, § 1
[1913] N.Y. Laws 2277. See Project, New York Workmen's Compensation Law: Problems
and Perspectives, 26 BUFFALO L. REv. 637, 640-41 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Project].
2 78 See N.Y. EMPL'RS LIAB. LAW § 2 (McKinney 1955 & Supp. 1980-1981). Under Section
2 of the New York Employers' Liability Law, the fellow servant rule is barred as a defense
only when a negligent employee had been acting for his employer in a supervisory capacity.
Id.; see WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 75, at 14-15.
7 See W. PROSSER, supra note 75, § 80, at 532-33. The fellow servant rule "has been
said to have 'practically disappeared with [the enactment of] workmen's compensation'"
laws. Id. at 533. Nevertheless, the rule has been invoked as an effective defense in actions
instituted by employees in occupations not covered by workers' compensation. See id. at
526; 2C 0.
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§ 2.01[5][e], at 60 (Bender

1978). Employees not covered by workers' compensation have been denied recovery under
the fellow servant doctrine. E.g., Fay v. DeCamp, 257 N.Y. 407, 409-10, 178 N.E. 677, 678
(1931); Buchalski v. Kramer, 243 App. Div. 703, 704, 277 N.Y.S. 91, 92-93 (2d Dep't 1935);
Glennie v. Falls Equip. Co., 238 App. Div. 7, 9, 263 N.Y.S. 124, 128 (4th Dep't 1933); cf.
Reboni v. Case Bros., 137 Conn. 501, 505, 78 A.2d 887, 889 (1951) (fellow servant rule is
operable except if employer is directly negligent). But see Poniatowski v. City of New York,
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Recently, in Lawrence v. City of New York,8 0 the Appellate Divi-

sion, Second Department, confronted with such a situation, abolished the fellow servant rule, holding that it is not a viable defense
to an employee's action against his employer for injuries sustained
due to the negligence of a coemployee.8 1
In Lawrence, a New York City firefighter, Anthony Lawrence,
was injured while fighting a fire in Brooklyn. Lawrence, who was

resting in the backyard of a burning building,"3 was struck and
rendered unconscious by a couch which had been "thrown or
pushed" from an upstairs window of the building." During Lawrence's ensuing personal injury action, which was instituted more
than 1 year after the accident, the defendant New York City

moved to dismiss the complaint upon the theory that the plaintiff's
exclusive remedy was under the New York Workers' Compensation

Law,

or in the alternative, that the action was barred by the fel-

the
low servant rule. 6 The Supreme Court, Kings County, denied
motion, holding that neither the Workers' Compensation Law87 nor
14 N.Y.2d 76, 81, 198 N.E.2d 237, 238, 248 N.Y.S.2d 849, 851 (1964), rev'g 19 App. Div. 2d
64, 241 N.Y.S.2d 770 (2d Dep't 1963); Buckley v. City of New York, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 28, 1980,
at 13, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County), aff'd mem., 81 App. Div. 2d 1044 (1st Dep't 1981);
Jakes v. City of New York, 88 Misc. 2d 355, 356, 388 N.Y.S.2d 507, 509 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1976).
80 82 App. Div. 2d 485, 447 N.Y.S.2d 506 (2d Dep't 1981), af'g N.Y.L.J., Dec. 13, 1979,
at 14, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Kings County).
81 Id. at 503-04, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
82 Id. at 487, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
83 Id.

"Id. Evidence was introduced at the trial tending to show that Lawrence and other
firefighters had been directed by a superior officer to take a break. Furthermore, there was
some evidence that during defenestration of smoldering items that might reignite the building, proper procedure required a lookout downstairs and warnings from the crew upstairs.
Id. at 486-88, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 507-08.
"Lawrence v. City of New York, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 13, 1979, at 14, col 5 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County).
88 Id. at 15, col. 1.
87 The trial court held that New York City firefighters are not covered under Workers'
Compensation because they are not included in the statutory definition of an employee, see
N.Y. WORK. CoMP. LAW §§ 2(3)-(5), 3(1) (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1980-1981), and because
the city had not elected coverage. See Lawrence v. City of New York, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 13,
1979, at 14, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Kings County); N.Y. WoRK. Comp. LAW § 3, Group 19; note 107
infra. Notably, it has long been the rule in New York that city policemen and firefighters
are not covered by the Workers' Compensation.Law. E.g., Ryan v. City of New York, 228
N.Y. 16, 20, 126 N.E.2d 350, 351 (1920) (police officers); Krug v. City of New York, 196 App:
Div. 226, 229-30, 186 N.Y.S. 727, 729-30 (3d Dep't 1921) (firefighters); 9 Op. N.Y. Comp. 184
(1953) (firefighters). In holding that city firefighters are not employees for purposes of workers' compensation, the Lawrence court noted the benefits accorded firefighters imd police
officers who are injured in the line of duty. Lawrence v. City of New York, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 13,
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the fellow servant rule prohibited the action.""
On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed.8 9 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Titoneg° initially
noted that, pursuant to an exception to the fellow servant rule created by the New York Employers' Liability Law, a personal injury
action probably would have inured to the plaintiff's benefit had it
been timely instituted.9 1 Because such action was time-barred,
however, the court reviewed only the viability of the fellow servant
doctrine.92 In this regard, the court assessed the nondelegable
duty9" and assumption of risk94 exceptions to the fellow servant
1979, at 14, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Kings County); see NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 19, §
487a-7.1, at 416 (1976) (full pay during absence from duty caused by injury); NEW YORK,
N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 19, § B19-4.0, at 444 (1976) (pension for permanent disability); NEW
YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 49, § B49-10.0, at 31 (1975) (paid hospital care and treatment). Interestingly, state police officers are covered by the mandatory coverage provision of

the New York Workers' Compensation Law. N.Y. WORK. Comp.LAW § 3, Group 16 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1980-1981); see 1935 Op. N.Y. Ar'y GEN. 189.
" Lawrence v. City of New York, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 13, 1979, at 15, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County). The lower court, citing the Court of Appeals dictum in Poniatowski, see note 76
supra, and its own decision in Jakes v. City of New York, 88 Misc. 2d 355, 358, 388 N.Y.S.2d
507, 509 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1976), held that the fellow servant rule was not a defense to
the plaintiff's action. N.Y.L.J., Dec. 13, 1979, at 15, col. 1.
89Lawrence v. City of New York, 82 App. Div. 2d 485, 504, 447 N.Y.S.2d 506, 517 (2d
Dep't 1981).
90 Justices Rabin, Margett, and Weinstein joined Justice Titone.
91 Id. at 490, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 509. The New York Employers' Liability Law "provides
that an action under such law must be commenced 'within one year after the occurrence of
the accident causing the injury or death.'" Id. at 489 n.2., 447 N.Y.S.2d at 509 n.2. (quoting
N.Y. EMPL'Rs LIAR. LAW § 3 (McKinney 1955 & Supp. 1980-1981)). In Lawrence, the accident occurred on February 2, 1971, and the action was filed on February 8, 1972. Lawrence
v. City of New York, 82 App. Div. 2d 485, 485-86, 447 N.Y.S.2d 506, 507 (2d Dep't 1981).
82 App. Div. 2d at 490, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
"Id. at 490-95, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 509-12; see Loughlin v. New York, 105 N.Y. 159, 162,
11 N.E. 371, 372 (1887). An employee has a cause of action against his employer for the
negligent performance of a nondelegable duty since it is a duty personal to the master.
Hence, the nonperformance or negligent performance of that duty by anyone, including a
fellow employee, will give rise to an action that will not be barred by the fellow servant rule.
McGuire v. Bell Tel. Co., 167 N.Y. 208, 211-12, 60 N.E. 433, 434 (1901); 2 W.F. BAMIEY,
PERSONAL INJulms § 537 (1912). Examples of nondelegable duties include the duty to provide a safe place to work, to provide safe equipment and tools, to give warnings of dangerous
conditions of which the employee is unaware, to provide a sufficient number of workers, and
to enforce work rules. W. PROSSER,supra note 75, § 80, at 526. The court in Lawrence held
that the nondelegable duty exception would not act to bar the application of the fellow
servant rule in the instant case. Lawrence v. City of New York, 82 App. Div. 2d 485, 495,
447 N.Y.S.2d 506, 512 (2d Dep't 1981). The court reasoned that the failure to provide a
firefighter to direct traffic on the ground floor of the premises related to a detail of work, not
to a duty personal to the master. Id. at 491-92, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
"The fellow servant rule may not be invoked unless the employee has assumed the
risk of injuries "arising from the carelessness and negligence of those who are in the same
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rule, but held that neither was applicable in the instant case. 5 Justice Titone thereupon reasoned that because the fellow servant
rule was not founded upon "natural justice but on an absurd and
disingenuous public policy," 8 it would be "illogical and self-defeating" to create further exceptions to the rule. Moreover, the court
questioned the propriety of barring coemployees, who are more
likely to be injured in a workplace accident than are nonemployees, from recovery against an employer."8 In light of these considerations,99 the Lawrence court held the fellow servant rule to be
invalid. 100
It is submitted that the Lawrence court properly abrogated
the fellow servant rule.10 1 Indeed, it appears that the legislature,
employment." 1 F.F. DREssER,

THE EMPLOYERS' LiILrry AcTS AND ThE ASSUMPTION OF
259 (1902 & Supp. 1908); see Relyea v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & G.R.R., 112 Mo. 86, 93, 20
S.W. 480, 481 (1892) (en banc); Glennie v. Falls Equip. Co., 238 App. Div. 7, 9, 263 N.Y.S.
124, 128 (4th Dep't 1933). The court in Lawrence disposed of the assumption of risk issue
by noting that although the jury had found that the plaintiff had not assumed the risk of
the tortious incident, it did not and could not find, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff did
not assume the ordinary risks of employment. The employee, simply by entering into the
employment relationship, was said to knowingly assume the perils associated with his trade.
Lawrence v. City of New York, 82 App. Div. 2d 485, 497, 447 N.Y.S.2d 506, 513 (2d Dep't
1981). The Lawrence court also observed that the plaintiff, a member of an engine company,
and the negligent firefighters, members of a ladder company, were contributing to a common
cause and would, therefore, be considered fellow servants under the common law. Id. at 49798, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 513-14.
95 82 App. Div. 2d at 490-98, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 509-14; see notes 93 & 94 and accompanying text supra.
" 82 App. Div. 2d at 503, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 517. Justice Titone reasoned that the premise of the fellow servant rule, namely, that workplace safety would be encouraged by reducing the opportunity for recovery of damages, was based upon the erroneous assumption
that an employee is "endowed with ...
ultra sensory perception ...
[sufficient] to forewarn him of the careless propensities of his working counterparts." Id.
-7 Id. at 502-03, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 517. Notably, judicial dissatisfaction with the fellow
servant rule has prompted modifications and exceptions created on a case-by-case basis. See
Fitzwater v. Warren, 206 N.Y. 355, 356, 99 N.E. 1042, 1042 (1912). The Lawrence court
cited the nondelegable duty exception, the vice principal exception, the superior servant
exception, the different department exception, and the dangerous agency exception as examples of the erosion of the fellow servant rule. 82 App. Div. 2d at 502, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
82 App. Div. 2d at 503, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
Id. at 498-502, 447 N.Y.S.2d 514-16. The Lawrence court also found support for its
holding in the Court of Appeals' decision in Poniatowski v. City of New York, 14 N.Y. 76,
81, 198 N.E.2d 237, 238, 248 N.Y.S.2d 849, 851 (1964), wherein the Court questioned the
propriety of the fellow servant rule. 82 App. Div. 2d at 498-502, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 514-16.
100 82 App. Div. 2d at 503-04, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
1o1New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188,200 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakley, 220 F.
RISK

378, 381-82 (S.D. Iowa 1914), affl'd, 243 U.S. 210, 219 (1917); Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201
N.Y. 271, 289, 94 N.E. 431, 437-38 (1911); cf. Dirken v. Great N. Paper Co., 110 Me. 374,
384-88, 86 A. 320, 325-26 (1913) (it is within a state's power to abrogate fellow servant rule
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which also is empowered to abolish the rule, failed to do so merely
because of the infrequency of the rule's usage. Nonetheless, it is
suggested that the elimination of the fellow servant rule, by
whatever means,"0 2 is essential to alleviate the inequity occasioned
by permitting some employees to redress their injuries under employers' liability or workers' compensation laws, while nonsuiting
other employees who are subject to the common-law fellow servant
rule.
Of course, abolition of the fellow servant rule will impact upon
both the Employers' Liability and the Workers' Compensation
laws. Notably, section 2(2) of the Employers' Liability Law, which
provides an exception to the fellow servant rule when injuries have
been caused by a negligent co-employee acting in a supervisory capacity, 103 would be rendered superfluous. 104 Moreover, for those
employees who would heretofore have had only the Employers' Liwith respect to acts of superintendence). Several states have statutes limiting or totally abrogating the fellow servant defense. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 81-1201, 81-1209 (1947); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 8-42-201 (1973) (complete abrogation); IDAHO CODE § 44-1401 (1977); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 48; § 172-38 (Smith-Hurd 1969); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-9-1 (Burns 1974); MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 153, § 1 (West 1958); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4113.03 (Page 1973); 43
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 171 (Purdon 1964). See also J. MUNKMAN, EMPLOYERS' LIABILrrY AT
COMMON LAW 87 (7th ed. 1971) (abrogation of fellow servant rule in England by statute).
102 Although the appellants in Lawrence had argued that only the legislature could abrogate the fellow servant rule, Brief for Appellant at 16, Lawrence v. City of New York, 82
App. Div. 2d 485, 447 N.Y.S.2d 506 (2d Dep't 1981), the court did not address that issue in
invalidating the rule. Notably, however, in Beutler v. Grand Trunk Junction Ry., 224 U.S.
85, 88 (1912), Justice Holmes stated that "[t]he doctrine as to fellow servants may be, as it
has been called, a bad exception to a bad rule, but it is established, and it is not open to
courts to do away with it upon their personal notions of what is expedient." Id. at 88. But
see Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 508, 239 N.E.2d 897, 903, 293
N.Y.S.2d 305, 313 (1968) (citing Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 355-56, 102 N.E.2d 691,
694-95 (1951)). The Court in Millington held that it was necessary for the courts to remain
flexible and to alter court-made rules when a change was required. 22 N.Y.2d at 508, 239
N.E.2d at 903, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 313; see Crenshaw Bros. Produce Co. v. Harper, 142 Fla. 27,
47, 194 So. 353, 361 (1940).
103 N.Y. EMIL'Rs LLkS. LAW § 2(2) (McKinney 1955 & Supp. 1980-1981). It has been
noted that the cause of action under the Employers' Liability Law does not differ materially
from that existing at common law except that, under the Act, the employee could recover
for the negligence of a fellow servant who, at the time of the accident, was acting in a supervisory capacity. WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 75, at 14; Project, supra note
77, at 642 n.26. See generally G. ALGER & S. SLATER, NEW YORK EmrLovnS' LIABmrrY Acr
55 (2d ed. 1907).
'04 Of course, the Employers' Liability Law already has been rendered largely obsolete
by the Workers' Compensation Law. Indeed, the liability of an employer under the New
York Employers' Liability Act is restricted to employment situations not within the coverage of the New York Workers' Compensation Law. N.Y. EssL'Rs LIAB. LAW iii (McKinney
1955).
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ability Law exception available to them, a significant restriction to
suit is removed-as a prerequisite to the use of such law, notice
must be served on an employer within 1 year of an accident.10 5 In
contrast, of course, personal injury causes of action may be commenced within 3 years of a tortious event.110
The impact of the Lawrence decision upon the administration
of the Workers' Compensation statute also is significant. Since
there is now greater potential for an injured employee not covered
by Workers' Compensation to recover large judgments in a common-law cause of action, it appears that employers increasingly
will elect Workers' Compensation coverage to protect themselves
from large and unexpected adverse judgments.10 7 Surely, this response, which will increase the number of employees covered by
Workers' Compensation, is desirable.
Susan D. Koester

Notwithstanding court officer's declaration that defendant is
"under arrest," absence of probable cause does not require suppression of evidence seized during pat-down search when other
indicia of arrest are not present
A warrantless search is considered illegal under the fourth
amendment 0 8 unless it falls within one of the narrow exceptions
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EMPL'RS LIAB. LAw § 3 (McKinney 1955 & Supp. 1980-1981); see note 91 supra.
1- CPLR 214 (1972 & Supp. 1980-1981).
107See, e.g., Lane v. Flack, 73 App. Div. 2d 65, 67, 425 N.Y.S.2d 648, 650 (3d Dep't
1980), afl'd, 52 N.Y.2d 856, 857, 418 N.E.2d 671, 671, 437 N.Y.S.2d 78, 78 (1981). In Lane,
because the defendant county hospital had brought itself within the coverage of the New
York Workers' Compensation Law, recovery under such statute was held to be the plaintiff's
exclusive remedy. Id.; see Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1930); N.Y. WORK.
Comp. LAw § 11 (McKinney 1955 & Supp. 1980-1981) (recovery under the Workers' Compensation Law is exclusive); COMMISSION OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR, THE NATIONAL Crvc FEDERATION, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, S. Doc. No. 419, 63d Cong., 2d Sess.
17 (1914); Workmen's Compensation: Hearings on H.R. 1 Before the Committee on the
Judiciary,61st Cong., 138 (1910) (brief of H.V. Mercer). Significantly, Section 3, Group 19
of the New York Workers' Compensation Law provides that "[a]ny municipal corporation
... may bring its employees... within the coverage of this chapter... notwithstanding
the definitions of the terms 'employment', 'employer' or 'employee'" N.Y. WORK. Com.
LAw § 3(1), Group 19 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1980-1981); see 9 Op. N.Y. Comp. (1953);
1976 INF. Op. N.Y. Arr'y GEN. 140; cf. 9 Op. N.Y. Comp. 297 (1953) (village has implied
authority to elect workers' compensation coverage).
108 The fourth amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

